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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CO~L\IERCL\L BAXI~ OF rTAH, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff n nd RPs pond ent, 
vs. 
~TATE OF rTAH and ROY \V. 
SIJDIOXS as Bank Com111issioner 
for the State of Utah, 
Defendants and ApzJPllants. 
BRIEF OF RESPOXDEKT 
~TATE)JEXT OF FACTS 
No. 7G3G 
The statement of facts as set forth in the Brief of 
Appellants is essential]~· correct. \\T e desire however to 
enlarg-t• some upon it and call the attention of the Court 
to these further matters. 
The record i:-; undisputed, and in fact the bank rom-
missionPr himself testified, that the a111onnt of time and 
enrrg-~· w·e<>:-;sary to he expended h~· the banking depart-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ment in connection with supervision and examination of 
banks is not determined by the size of the institution 
nor the amount of assets which such banking institution 
has, but that "it is the number of problems you find at 
the particular date of entry.* * * * *" and that "it is 
really the condition of the assets and loans rather than 
the amount of the assets which determines the time 
required to be spent in examination and supervision of 
the banking institution." (R. 23) 
The Court found as a fact "that there is no reason-
able relationship between the amount assessed against 
the corporation or any of its branches and the amount 
of work actually performed or required to be performed 
by the bank commissioner or the state banking depart-
ment in the supervision and examination of the plaintiff 
corporation and its branches." (R. 61) 
Prior to the time of consolidation of the five banks 
which now compose the five branches of the plaintiff 
banking corporation, there was assessed against them 
only the charges applicable separately to each of the 
five separate banks. At that time there was no charge 
comparable to the $1000.00 which was charged against 
the Spanish Fork main office, based upon the aggregate 
assets of all of the branches. In other words presently 
and under the assessment which is complained of, each 
individual bank was assessed upon its aggregate asset~ 
and then the Spanish For~ main office was again as-
sessed in a lump sum upon the aggregate assets of all 
those branches which had already been assessed. This 
procedure was followed, and the banking departmf'nt 
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attempts to justify it under the existing statutes, in 
spite of the fact that since the consolidation of the five 
banks into the one Commercial Bank of Utah the evidence 
shows that after the examinations have been made of 
each of the five branch offices, the entire work of 
examiners is practically complete. There is no banking 
business carried on and no deposits received in the main 
office and no loans are made through the main office. 
There is no credit examination there and there is merely 
a consultation with the executive officers as to matters 
of policies and the ehecking over of the bond account 
which is held at the main office. (R. 40 & 41) 
By the consolidation of the five banks to one, there 
has been no change in the nature of the assets, except 
that prior to the consolidation, the bond accounts were 
kept separately at the various branches, whereas since 
the consolidation the bond accounts are kept only at the 
main office thereby making it necessary to have only 
one place to check that account. (R. 42) The record 
further shows that by reason of the consolidation the 
time and effort necessary to make the examination of 
the various banks, which now are branches, has been 
reduced and the task made easier by reason of the 
matters above set forth and because there is a· central-
ized policy and one consultation with the executive 
officers in the head office which takes the plaee of con-
~ultations with five executive officers as independent 
operating units; also hecause of the uniformity of credit 
files and the available credit information as to security 
values, water stoek and other securities which the exam-
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iners may have a question about, such information all 
being available at the one office. (R. 43) 
The Court accordingly found as a fact: "There is no 
reasonable relationship between the amount assessed 
for the examination and supervision of the various 
branches of the plaintiff corporation and that assessed 
for the examination and supervision of the main office 
of the plaintiff when compared with the work involved 
or time consumed in such an examination and super-
vision." (R.61) 
By the provision of Section 7-1-11 which is under 
attack in this action the maximum assessment permitted 
to be charged a banking institution is $1500.00 based 
upon a bank having aggregate assets of $15,000,000.00 
or over-This, although there are banks in the state 
which have assets in the neighborhood of $80,000,000.00 
(R. 39). So that under the present statute a bank having 
assets of $15,000,001.00 pays the same fee as a bank 
having $80,000,000.00. 
The salary of the bank commissioner is fixed hy 
statute. (Sec. 87-1-8.10-Amendment by Laws of 1945). 
The Bank examiners are paid fixed monthly salaries 
(R. 52). So that the amount of such salaries of either 
the commissioner or the examiners employed in his 
department are not dependant upon the amount received 
from the examination of a bank nor does the amount 
assessed against any bank under Sec. 7-1-11, or any 
other provision of the statutes in question, in any way 
affect or change the amount of salary whirh the hank 
commissioner or other employees of the banking depart-
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ment would receive for services rendered in connection 
with the exmnination and supervision of the banking 
institutions. 
National banks doing a banking business in the state 
of Utah are not required to pay the charges as set up in 
Sec. 7-1-11 and Sec. 7-3-6, nor is there any other fee 
paid by said banks to the State of Utah or the banking 
department based on the aggregate assets of such banks. 
The banking department however, through the State 
Depository Board, does have jurisdiction over national 
banks insofar as any such national banks are deposi-
tories of public funds. As depositories of public funds 
the national banks are subject to examination by the 
banking department and on at least one occasion the 
present bank commissioner and his employees have 
made an examination of a national bank in connection 
with such capacity as a depository of public funds. 
Such national banks when so examined, and though 
subject to the supervision of the bank department-at 
least in the capacity Inentioned-do not pay anything 
for the examination made of them by the state banking 
department and do not contribute any funds to the 
financial institutions fund to assist in paying the cost 
of operation of the state government or state banking 
department. (R. 24 & 25 ). In other words monies paid 
into the financial institutions fund and appropriated out 
of said fund by the Legislature to the banking depart-
ment may be, and in the past have heen, used by the 
banking departlnent to pay the cost of supervision and 
examination of national banking institutions which do 
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not contribute to the fund. (R. 25) 
The respondent corporation has always paid its 
re'gular property taxes, income taxes and all other taxes 
which have been legally assessed against it in addition 
to and without regard to the charges assessed against it 
under the provisions of Sec. 7-1-11 and Sec. 7-3-6 (R. 41). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
THE CHARGES ASSESSED AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF 
AS A BANKING INSTITUTION UNDER THE PROVISIONS 
OF SECTIONS 7-1-11 and 7-3-6, U. C. A. 1943, ARE IN 
FACT AD VALOREM OR PROPERTY TAXES AND ARE 
INVALID AS BEING IN CONTRAVENTION OF ARTICLE 
XIII, SECTIONS 2, 3 and 11 and ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. SUCH STATUTES 
DO NOT ESTABLISH A VALID OCCUPATION TAX OR 
REGULATORY LICENSE TAX OR FEE. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE CHARGES ASSESSED AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF 
AS A BANKING INSTITUTION UNDER THE PROVISIONS 
OF SECTION 7-1-11 AND SECTION 7-3-6 ARE IN FACT AD 
VALOREM OR PROPERTY TAXES AND ARE INVALID 
AS BEING IN CONTRAVENTION OF ARTICLE XIII, SEC-
TIONS 2, 3, AND 11, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. SUCH STATUTES DO NOT 
ESTABLISH A VALID OCCUPATION TAX OR REGULA-
TORY LICENSE TAX OR FEE. 
While the Appellants have broken down their nrgn-
rnent into three parts set forth as their Statement of 
Points and Argument, it seems to us that the questions 
involved in the matter and as discussed hy the appellant:; 
are so intPr-related that the~~ can ver~r propPrly be 
() 
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considered under one heading as above set forth. Hence, 
under thi~ one heading we will endeavor to answer the 
argu1nent~ of appellants and set forth the contentions 
of the respondent. 
As the appellants have admitted, the well recognized 
rule is that as to whether or not a charge made by the 
State is a direct property tax or a franchise, occupational 
or license tax, depends not upon what the Legislature 
or anyone else calls it, but upon the incidents of the 
particular charge itself. We need only to look at the 
statutes involved in this case and the procedures fol-
lowed and the uses made and authorized to be made 
of the charges collected to see that these charges which 
were paid by the respondent under protest and concern-
ing which respondent complains are in fact ad valorem 
or property taxes. 
It has been admitted from the outset that if the 
eharges set up by said Sections are in fact property 
taxes, then they are invalid as being lacking in uniformity. 
Although the facts are of course somewhat different, 
we have here essentially the same question of law as 
was presented to this court in the case of Smith v. Carbon 
County, 90 lTtah 560; 63 Pac. (2d) 259. That case in-
volved the question as to the validity of the provisions 
of Section 28-2-1 revised Statutes of Utah 1933, par-
ticularly as they provided for graduated fees to be paid 
to the County Clerk for services in probate and guardian-
ship proceedings based upon the values of the estates, 
as fixed by the inventory. This court in considering the 
question there involved stated that the fir~t thing to be 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
determined was as to whether or not the various amounts 
innumerated in the graduated scale under the statute 
constitute a fee or a tax. This court then said: 
"The adjudiciated cases define the fee of an 
officer as 'reward or compensation allowed by 
law to an officer for specific services performed 
by him in the discharge of official duties' 25 C.J. 
1009, and cases cited in footnote." 
The Court then went on to say: 
"* * * * * *if the amount required to be paid 
in a given case for filing an inventory and ap-
praisement does not bear some reasonable rela-
tion to the extent and kind of services required 
to be performed, the money so required to be 
paid, no matter how it is characterized by the 
Legislature, may not be said to be a fee." 
In applying the facts in that case to the law, the 
Court stated: 
"Experience, however, teaches us that the 
amount of service required in a probate proceed-
ing of the clerk and Judge do not depend upon 
the appraisal value of the estate being probated, 
but rather upon such matters as the number of 
heirs, legatees, or devisees, the number of credi-
tors, the character of the property being probated, 
number of sales of property sought in probate 
proceedings, etc." 
To point out the similarity between the Smith v. 
Carbon County case and the present case, we call atten-
tion to the fact that by the stipulation entered into and 
by the testimony of the witnesses it is undisputed that 
the amount of service and supervision required to be 
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given to a banking institution by the banking commission 
or banking department through examinations and other-
wise is not dependent upon the amount of the aggregate 
assets of the bank, but rather upon the nature and condi-
tion of the loans and other assets and accounts and upon 
numerous other variable factors such as the general 
economic condition of the area served by the institution, 
percent of total assets to cash and balances with other 
banks, U. S. Government assets, total capital accounts, 
percentage of total loans classified by the examiner as 
being past due, sub-standard, doubtful, or immediate 
loss; the type, size and number of loans made, and 
various other factors. (R. 23, 60, 63-64). 
In the Smith 1). Carbon County case in commenting 
upon the argument that the graduated rate of fee was 
justifiable because the extent of responsibility assumed 
by the clerk and Judge becomes greater as the value of 
the· estate increased, the court pointed out that such 
argument had no validity in fact. It stated that neither 
the Judge nor the clerk was charged with the actual 
management, custody or control of the property of the 
estate. In the case at bar, the banking department and 
the bank examiners are not charged with the actual 
management, custody or control of the property or assets 
of the bank. The court in the Smith case stated that the 
responsibilities of the clerk and the .Judge were not 
enhanced because the value of the estate was of greater 
value, and that the Judge and the Clerk are each paid 
a fixed salary the amount of ·which is not dependent 
upon the size of the estate probated in the court in which 
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they are officers. The analogy is clear as to this case. 
The bank commissioner and the bank examiners are 
paid a fixed salary and the amount of such salary is in 
no way dependent upon the size of the banking institution 
which they may examine nor upon the amount of the 
charges paid by such banking institution. Whether the 
banking examiners are assigned to duties in examining 
a bank with assets of $100,000.00 or a bank with assets 
of $80,000,000.00 during a particular month, the salary 
and compensation of such bank examiner, and for that 
matter the bank commissioner, continues on exactly the 
same basis. 
After considering the facts as above discussed in 
the case of Smith v. Carbon County, this court then 
concluded: 
"What we do hold is that the amount of 
fees that may be exacted must bear some reason-
able relation to the extent and nature of the 
services rendered. Otherwise, such fees are, in 
contemplation of law, taxes. That being taxes, 
they must be uniform* * * * * " 
The court then held that the fees and the schedule 
of fees was invalid because it was in conflict with the 
constitutional provisions relied upon by the plaintiff, 
which provisions were the identical ones relied upon hy 
respondents in this case insofar as the question of 
uniformity is concerned. 
In addition to the various matters disrn;-:srd 1))' the 
Court in the case of Smith v. Carbon Co11ufy n"ferred to 
above to be considered in determining ·whether or not a 
10 
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charge set up by statute is a property tax or a fee of 
some other kind, the courts have referred to other mat-
ters to be considered. One of the things which the courts 
have looked to and upon which they have placed emphasis 
is the question as to what is permitted to be done with 
the monies after they have been collected; and in any 
case where monies so collected are permitted to be or 
may be used for general public purposes, or for purposes 
of a public nature, then it has been held that the charges 
80 made are taxes rather than fees. 
In State ex rel Davidson v. Gorman (Minn) 41 NW 
948 the court pointed out that since the statute there in 
question required the money to remain in the treasury 
as part of the general county funds, to be used in paying 
the salary of probate judges, it was evident that the 
purpose for which the statutory exactions were required 
was public in nature, and consequently indicated that 
t'luch exactions were in the nature of taxes. 
In State ex rel Sanderson v. Mann (Wise) 45 NW 
526, 46 NW 51, in holding that the charges exacted by a 
Wisconsin statute as a condition precedent to the filing' 
of an executor"s or administrator's account could not be 
sustained as probate fees, but were in reality taxes, the 
eourt said: 
"The law nowhere prescribes the object or 
use to which the money so paid is to be applied. 
There seems to be nothing to prevent its being 
expended for any legitimate county purposes or 
public improvement." 
It will, of course, he observed that frmn the begin-
ll 
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ning and throughout the history of the statutes relating 
to banks and financial institutions (as will be more fully 
discussed hereinafter) and particularly as relates to the 
collection from such institutions of charges referred to as 
being in the nature of charges for examination and super-
vision of such institutions, such charges have always 
been directed to be paid into the state treasury to be 
credited to the general fund. This was unconditionally 
so until the enactment of Section 7-1-11 X, U.C.A. 1943, 
which in its present form as amended by the Laws of 
1941, First Special Session, Chapter 3 read as follows: 
"All fees accruing to the banking department 
as hereinbefore provided in this act shall be paid 
by the bank commissioner into the state treasurer 
monthly, and shall constitute a separate and dis-
tinct fund, which shall be known as the financial 
institution fund. All expenses incurred and all 
compensation paid by the department in the 
administration of this act shall be paid out of 
the financial institutions fund upon order of the 
commission on vouchers approved by the state 
auditor. No part of such fund shall revert to the 
general fund of the state at the close of an~· 
fiscal year until such fund shall amount to $25,000 
in which event any amount in such fund in exee:-;:-; 
of $25,000 shall revert to the general fund at the 
end of each fiscal year." 
It will be observed that under the present act it 
IH provided that after the fund reaches the amount of 
$25,000.00 the excess shall spill over into the general 
fund at the end of each fiscal year. \Vhile the appellant~ 
have laid smne stress upon the fad that only on mw 
12 
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occasion has there eYer been a tilne when the spill over 
did in fact go into the general fund, it is significant to 
note that such fund did carry substantial balances in 
excess of $~5,000.00 at the end of each of the fiscal years 
1947, El-!S, 1949 and 1950 (Exhibit 3, R. 13), which 
overages under the provisions of the statute should have 
reverted to the general fund. The fact that they were 
not in fact transferred to the general fund is of no 
significance. The important thing is that under the law 
such overages are not only permitted to but are required 
to revert to the general fund for general public purposes. 
It is not what actually is done, but what a statute permits 
and contemplates that determines the nature of such 
statute and the nature of any funds referred to in such a 
statute. Even with regard to the funds from the financial 
institutions fund which are not spilled over and paid 
into the general fund, but which under the terms of 
Section 7-1-11 X are appropriated by the Legislature 
from the financial institutions fund to pay the expenses 
of the banking department, the record clearly shows that 
the use of such funds is not limited to payment for super-
vision and examination of the institutions which pay 
the money into the fund. All of the expenses of the 
banking department are paid out of such fund. The 
hanking department is operated for a public purpose 
and for the public good, and it has numerous public 
duties which it perfonns outside and beyond the scope 
of examinations and supervision of the financial institu-
tions who pay into the fund under the provisions of 
Nrrtions 7-1-11 and 7-3-6. One example of such puhlie 
] ') ,) 
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duties is in connection with the bank commissioner serv-
ing as a member of the State Depository Board. In this 
capacity the banking department through the bank com-
missioner keeps a check upon all banks or financial insti-
tutions wherein public funds are deposited and whenever 
necessary makes an examination of any such institutions 
to determine whether or not they are sound and whether 
or not they are complying with the State Depository Act. 
Many of these public depositories are national banks 
which do not pay any fees into the state treasury to 
become a part of the so-called financial institutions fund. 
The expenses for operation of the State Depository 
Board as referred to in Section 74-1-8, U.C.A. 1943 
have always been paid out of the appropriation made 
through the banking department for its operations. 
We believe no one would seriously deny that the 
functions of the banking department are of a publir 
nature and for the benefit of the public generally and 
that the expenditure of the funds paid into the financial 
institutions fund by the respondent banking institution 
and other banking institutions constitute expenditures 
for general public purposes. In other words, the funds 
obtained from the charges set up by Sections 7-1-11 
and 7-3-6 are collected for and expended for general 
public purposes and as such are property taxes. 
As was pointed out in the Statement of Facts herein 
above set forth, the record shows clearly that by the 
consolidation of the five banks which are the branch 
banks of the respondent corporation and which pre-
viously were operated as separate independent hank,, 
14 
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the work of exan1ination has become less burdensome 
rather than more burdensmne. As the court properly 
found there is no reasonable relationship whatsoever 
between the amount of $1000.00 charged against the 
so-called Spanish Fork main office and the amount of 
work required to examine and supervise said main office. 
As a n1atter of fact the record, as pointed out in the 
Statement of Facts, clearly shows that there is practi-
cally no exa1nination or supervision required for the 
main office. All of such work relates now as it did before 
to the examination of and supervision of the various 
branches. But this supervision and examination of the 
various branches has been made easier by consolidating 
numerous of the records in the main office where they 
can be exa1nined simultaneously. Appellants in their 
Brief contend that the provisions of the statutes in 
question with regard to these fees do not violate the 
uniformity of operations of laws requirement of the 
constitution, they contending that these fees fall equally 
upon all similarly situated. Under the undisputed facts 
in this case such is not the case. It is shown clearly that 
a bank with assets of $15,000,001.00 pays the same fee 
as a bank with aggregate assets of $80,000,000.00 or more. 
Because of the admitted lack of relationship between 
the amount charged against the plaintiff banking institu-
tion and the costs of services rendered by the banking 
departn1ent, the appellant§ have sought some theory 
under which fees could be legally justified without regard 
to any reasonable quid pro quo: 
The main argument made hy appellant~ is that the 
15 
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charges assessed were occupation taxes or license fees 
and as such were valid and not violative of any consti-
tutional provisions by reason of Article XIII, Section 12 
of the Utah Constitution wherein it is stated that nothing 
in the constitution should prevent the Legislature from 
providing a stamp tax or a tax based on income, occupa-
tion, licenses or franchises. A history of the banking 
laws relating to these so-called fees effectively refutes 
appellants argument. 
The first statute setting up a Bank Commissioner 
was contained in Chap. 25, Laws of 1911, wherein it was 
provided that the Secretary of State would be ex-officio 
bank commissioner. Under him there were to be ap-
pointed by the Governor, by advice and consent of the 
Senate, one or more bank examiners whose duty would 
be to examine into the affairs of every bank and loan, 
trust or guaranty association, at least once in each year 
and oftener if the Bank Commissioner should deem it 
necessary. Sec. 5 of that act provided: 
"One examination each year shall be desig-
nated as the annual examination and for each such 
annual examination, the bank examined shall pay 
to the examiner, to be deposited in the State 
Treasury to the credit of the general fund, a 
fee as follows:" 
There follows a graduated fee of $25.00 on $100,000.00 
up to $250.00 on assets of over $25,000,000.00. That 
1911 law contained provisions allowing banks to be 
incorporated under general corporation laws. There 
were provisions concerning the amount of paid in capital 
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and surplus that would be required of banks, but no 
mention of any license or occupation fee. 
By the Laws of 1913, Chapter 45, this bank law 
was amended to set up a separate state banking depart-
ment. Section 5 of t 1hapter 45 of the 1913 Laws, Page 
;)~ provided: 
"The Bank Commissioner or Examiner shall 
visit and examine every bank other than savings 
banks at least twice in each year and every sav-
ings bank at least once in each year." 
Section 8 of the 1913 Act then provided : 
"For each examination as provided by this 
Act the bank examined shall pay the Commis-
sioner or Examiner making the examination, to 
be by the Conunissioner deposited with the State 
Treasury to the credit of the general fund, a fee 
as follows." 
rhe fee then provided was graduated from $20.00 for 
assets up to $100,000.00 and then on up to $200.00 for 
assets up to $25,000,000.00 or more. The 1913 Law was 
carried practically verbatum into the 1917 Compiled 
Laws of Utah as Section 978, Section 978 being the same 
as Section 8 of the 1913 Act. 
Section 97;) of the 1917 Compiled Laws reads a~ 
follows: 
"The bank commissioner or the examiner 
~hall visit and examine every ~;a\'ing~ bank at 
least once each year and every other bank, other 
than savings banks and building and loan as-
sociations, at least twice in each year." 
Then Nt>dion 97R of the 1917 Compiled Laws read: 
17 
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"For each examination as provided by this 
chapter, the bank examined shall pay the Com-
missioner or the Examiner making the examina-
tion, to be by the Commissioner deposited in the 
State Treasury to the credit of the general fund, 
a fee as follows:" 
The fee then provided was graduated as above indicated. 
Chapter 18, page 31 of the Laws of 1919, Amended 
Section 978 C. L. 1917, and in addition to raising the 
amount of the fees, added a new section reading: 
"A fee of $20.00 per day for each day re-
quired to make the examination of building and 
loan associations shall be charged, which shall 
be turned into the State Treasury to the credit of 
the general fund. The company so examined 
shall also be required to pay the necessary travel-
ling expenses of the bank commissioner or exam-
iner to and from the place of examination." 
Thus, in 1919, was added the provision not only charg-
ing building and loan associations the cost of examina-
tion, but also a provision for the paying of travelling 
expenses. 
The 1927 Legislature in Chapter 50, Section 7, 
page 7 4, enacted a provision for examination of indus-
trial loan companies. That Section provided: 
"The bank commissioner personally or by 
deputy may, at least once a year, for the purpose 
of making full investigation into the condition 
of such corporation, make an examination of 
such corporation. He is authorized to collect from 
such corporation for such services the sum of 
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Thus, it will be seen that when industrial loan companies 
were added to the jurisdiction of the bank commissioner 
a fee for serYires actually rendered to be paid for on a 
per diem basis for the time actually spent was set upon 
the statutes. 
In the 1917 Compiled Laws, there were provisions 
with respect to cooperative banks for personal credits. 
These corporations have since had their name changed 
to Credit Unions, but in 1917 Compiled Laws under 
Section lOG-! a provision was made that they should be 
subject to supervision of the bank commissioner and 
that section also provided: 
"The fee shall be $10.00 for each examination." 
Thus, it will be seen that with credit unions the fee 
originally set up for them was an examination fee and 
not a license or privilege or occupation tax. The law 
with respect to these credit unions or cooperative banks 
was amended by Laws of 1929, Chapter 40, wherein 
Section 1064 was reframed and it was provided that 
these credit unions or cooperative banks would be sub-
ject to Section 971 to 978, Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, 
and further "be subject to the supervision of the bank 
commissioner in the manner and to the extent set forth 
in said rhapter, provided that the fee shall be $1.25 for 
each hour actually spent in such examination." Thus, 
in 1929, the charges for examination of credit unions were 
st>t on an hourly basis. Although these cooperative hanks 
for personal credit have had their names rhanged to 
Credit Unions, the fee is still based upon an hourly 
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basis. Laws of 1945, Chapter 15, Section 7-7-26 as 
amended, reads : 
"All credit unions organized or doing bus-
iness under the provisions of this chapter shall 
pay to the bank commissioner of the State of 
Utah for the cost of supervision and examination 
of its corporations the sum of $2.00 per hour for 
each examiner engaged in making an examina-
tion of such corporation for such period of time 
as is necessarily consumed in the completing of 
such examination and shall pay all necessary 
travelling and hotel expenses." 
The Laws of 1929, Chap. 95, also amended the 
previous laws with respect to building and loan associa-
tions and provided that at least one examination should 
be had each year for such building and loan associations 
and oftener in the discretion of the bank commissioner. 
That statute further provided: 
"For each examiner employed a fee of $15.00 
per day for each day required to make the exam-
ination of a building and loan association shall be 
charged, which fee shall be turned into the State 
Treasury to the credit of the general fund. The 
company so examined shall also be required to 
pay the necessary hotel and travelling expense~ 
of the bank commissioner or examiner to and 
from the place of examination." 
Thus it will be seen that fron1 the time the stat<> 
banking department was set up and provisions made for 
examinations, the charges assessed against the financial 
institutions under the supervision of the banking depart-
ments were always ostensibly set up to reimburse tlw 
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department, at least in part, for the cost of examinations 
and supervision. Never were any of the charges made 
as a license or occupation fee nor as a tax upon the 
privilege of doing a banking business nor as a condition 
precedent to doing of the banking business. Always the 
intention indicated in the acts was that the fee should pay 
or help pay for the cost of examination, although the 
basis for charging the various institutions in most of 
the statutes was highly questionable because of the lack 
of uniformity even as between the various institutions 
covered by such acts. In every such act, from the begin-
ning, it was provided that the charges so made were to 
he turned into the State Treasury to become a part of 
the general fund. 
It is significant to note that when the legislature 
concluded to provide for a license or franchise tax upon 
one of the institutions placed under the jurisdiction of 
the banking department, it found no difficulty in clearly 
setting up such a license or privilege tax. This was done 
in connection with the law relating to small loan com-
panies. Section 7-1-8 U.C.A 1943, provides that small 
loan companies are under the supervision of the bank-
ing department and subject to examination and super-
vision by the bank commissioner. Section 7-1-11 contains 
a provision with respect to charges to be paid by small 
loan companies for examinations on the basis of $10.00 
per day for each examiner, but aside from such pay-
ments required by Section 7-1-11, small loan busi-
nesses are required to take out and maintain on an 
annual renPwal hasis, a licPnse to carry on and con-
:21 
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duct a small loan business. For such license and the 
privilege of doing a small loan business such licensee, 
before it is authorized to conduct such business, must 
pay a yearly license fee of $50.00 (Section 7-8-1 and 
7-8-2 UCA 1943). It is provided that such license fee 
shall be in addition to the payment required to be made 
"for examination by the bank commissioner." Section 
7-8-5 provided among other things, as to small loan 
companies: 
"The bank commissioner shall make an exam-
ination of the affairs, business, office and records 
of each licensee at least once each year. The 
actual cost of this examination shall be paid to 
the bank commissioner by every licensee so exam-
ined, and the bank commissioner may maintain an 
action for the recovery of such costs in any court 
of competent jurisdiction." 
The new small loans act passed by the legislature 
in 1945 (Chapter 15A, Laws of 1945) prohibits anyone 
from making small loans as therein referred to unle~s 
they hold the prop~r license. Section 5 of said act 
provides that 
"Each license shall remain in full force and 
effect until surrendered, revoked or suspended 
as hereinafter provided. Every licensee shall, 
on or before the lOth day of each Dec., pay to the 
Commissioner the sum of $100.00 for each license 
held by him as license fee for the succeeding 
calendar year." 
Section 8 of said act then provided that the commissioner 
shall make a yearly examination of each licensee, the 
actnol cost thereof to be paid by the licensee so e:nuJiined 
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and that "the commissioner n1ay maintain an action for 
the recovery of such costs in any court of competent 
jurisdiction." Thus, we get a clear picture of the situa-
tion where the legislature has endeavored to provide 
for the payment by the small loan companies of a fee 
to cover costs of supervision and examination on the 
one hand and for the setting up of a privilege or occupa-
tional or franchise tax on the other hand. A clear cut 
distinction is made by the legislature between these 
two charges. 
In the second special session of 1933, the legislature 
amended ~ertion 7-1-11 so that said statute provided: 
''All financial institutions under supervision 
of the state banking department of the State of 
Utah shall pay to the bank commission of the 
State of Utah, the fees for the cost of supervision 
and examination according to the following sche-
dule, to-wit:" 
There followed a statement of graduated fees wherein 
was provided, for banking institutions, upon assets of 
$100,000.00 or less there would be required a fee of 
$50.00 for each examination, but not to exceed $100.00 
per annum. The fees were then graduated up to where 
an institution having assets of over $15,000,000.00 would 
he required to pay a fee of $750.00 for each examination 
hut not to exceed $1,500.00 per annum. It was hut a 
~hort step then to the amendment which was made hy 
the 1935 laws which provided our present section 7-1-11 
wherein the words with respect to each examination were 
deleted and instead of saymg $50.00 per examination 
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but not more than $100 per year, it was merely provided 
that they should pay "for the cost of supervision and 
examination", $100 per year on $100,000 or less and then 
graduated up to $1,500 per year where the assets were 
over $15,000,000. 
It is also interesting to note that in the 1935 Laws 
no higher dassification was made than with respect to 
$15,000,000 assets even though as far back as 1913 we 
had had graduations with respect to these assets up to 
$25,000,000. It is also interesting to note that in the 
1935 amendment a separate schedule was set up for 
building and loan corporations. Also in the 1935 laws 
there was set up the provision still contained in Section 
7-1-11 which, immediately following the s~hedule of fees 
for ordinary banks, states that for the examination of 
trust departments in banks an additional $25.00 per diem 
shall be assessed for the chief examiner and $15.00 per 
diem for an assistant examiner. This likewise indicates 
that it was intended as payment for the cost of super-
vision and not in any manner a license, franchise or 
occupation tax. It will also be noted that Section 7-1-11 
still contains at the end of that section the provisions 
that these fees are to be paid to the State Bank Com-
missioner semi-annually on the first day of July and 
the 1st day of January each year; that foreign building 
and loan associations doing business in the state shall 
be assessed $15.00 per diem for each examiner; industria 1 
loan corporations for each examiner $20.00 per diem: 
small loan licensees for each examiner $10.00 per diem: 
cooperative banking for each examiner $1.25 per honr. 
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\Yith respect to small loan licensees, the later law of 
19-15 would perhaps take precedence and with respect 
to cooperative banks, which now carry the name Credit 
Unions, the fee has been raised on them by the 1945 Act 
to $2.00 per hour. It becomes apparent that in addition 
to the lack of uniformity as to.the basis of taxes upon 
property as between those institutions covered by Sec-
tions 7-1-11 and 7-3-6 and persons not covered by such 
Sections, there is a complete lack of uniformity as to the 
basis for the charges assessed even as between the 
institutions covered by said sections. For example, we 
observe that foreign building and loan corporations are 
assessed on the basis of $15.00 per diem for each 
examiner: industrial loan corporations on the basis of 
$20.00 per diem for each examiner, small loan licensees 
at $10.00 per diem for each examiner, cooperative bank-
ing at $1.25 per hour for each examiner. Where these 
examinations are made by state employees on a fixed 
salary, what justification can there be for charging on 
a different per diem basis for the examiner dependent 
upon the kind of institution he is examining~ 
It will also be noted that in Section 7-1-11, it is 
provided that in addition to the fees scheduled in this 
act, institutions under the supervision of the state bank-
ing department shall be charged necessary travelling 
and hotel expenses. \Vith respect to hotel and travelling 
expenses, the· progress of the law shows that originally 
hotel and travelling expenses were not included, but 
merely what was then called a fee for each examination. 
Later, the charge for each examination had added to it 
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necessary travelling expenses and finally there was the 
charge for the examination, plus necessary travelling 
expenses and hotel expenses. 
It thus becomes very evident that throughout the 
history of these statutes the legislature never intended 
the charges required to be paid by these financial insti-
tutions to be a license or franchise or occupation tax 
payable as a prerequisite to the doing of business (except 
of course, in the case of small loan companies where the 
franchise or license tax was expressly provided, in 
addition to the other charges). It was always clearly 
indicated that such charges were intended to reimburse 
the department, at least in part, for the cost of super-
vision and examination. It is quite probable that many, if 
not all of these statutes would, if attacked, have been held 
invalid because there was no uniformity as to the charges 
payable by the various institutions covered hy the acts. 
However, the fact remains that the basis for making such 
charges was clearly expressed by the legislature to he 
in payment for such examination and supervision, and 
not as occupation or privilege taxes. 
The main case relied upon and referred to in appel-
lants brief is the case of Salt Lake City r. Christensen, 
:1-t- Ftah 38, 95 Pac. 523. That case involved a ~alt Lake 
City ordinance which provided: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to 
engage in or carry on the business specified 
without first taking out or procuring the license 
required by such business." 
The license tax was based upon the value of goodf: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
held for sale and based upon that the 1nerchants had 
to pay an annual license tax. The ordinance also provided 
that it shall be unlawful for any merchant to commence 
or carry on his business without first making a state-
ment under oath of the cash value of his goods. 
A person may exmnine the banking laws of the State 
of Utah in vain in an attempt to find a provision for 
licensing or any provision requiring the payment of a 
fee as a condition precedent to engaging in the banking 
business. The only example in any of the organizations 
or institutions under the jurisdiction of the banking 
department is the license fee ·requirement provided for 
small loan business and no such a requirement is made 
of any other institution, and small loan businesses have 
to pay for examination and supervision in addition to 
this franchise or license fee. It will be noted however, 
that in every case where a question of an occupation 
tax or license tax has been involved, a license tax or 
orrupation tax has been set up as a condition precedent 
to engaging in the business and a person who does not 
pay the tax is not allowed to engage in such business. 
Our Utah sales tax is one of the best examples of 
a license or occupation tax particularly in the nature 
of an excise tax and Section 80-15-3, U.C.A. 1943 pro-
vides "It shall be unlawful for any person required by 
the provisions of this Act to engage in business within 
this state after the effective date of this Act without 
fhst having obtained an annual license therefor." Then 
follows provisions as to the excise tax imposed and pro-
visions for its collection and pa~·mPnt. The question 
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might be asked in connection with banks under juris-
diction of the banking department, "What would happen 
if a bank refused to pay the fee provided in Section 
7-1-11 ~" There is no authority in the law for the bank 
commissioner to suspend that bank's business or take 
over and liquidate the bank if the bank is otherwise in 
good sound condition. The law provides that this fee 
shall be paid as a cost of the supervision and the only 
answer that could be given in this respect is that as 
with small loan companies, the bank commissioner could 
perhaps sue to recover the fees, but the fees are not in 
any respect made a condition precedent to engaging in 
the business nor are they made a condition affecting 
the continuance of the business nor allowing the bank 
commissioner to take over or stop the bank from doing 
business if such fee is not paid. 
There is another section of the statute we have 
attacked to which we need make reference, and that if' 
Section 7-3-6, U.C.A., 1943. This section is the one that 
specifically provides for branch banking and provides 
that a bank must do business only at its banking house 
provided that it may establish branches on certain 
conditions. The conditions set up under which a bank 
may establish a branch however, are not the payment 
of these monies required for examination or supervision. 
It is not based upon the paying of any license fee or 
occupation tax, but in order for a bank to establish a 
branch it must have at least $60,000.00 capital and in 
order for it thereafter to establish an additional branch it 
it must have an additional $60,000.00 capital. HPrP tlwn 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is the only provision of the statute which sets up any 
condition precedent with respect to the establishment 
of any branch banking and it is a requirement in respect 
to the capital to be employed in the banks and nothing 
with respect to payment of any examination fees and 
nothing that would in any way effect the business of 
the bank as a condition which the bank must comply with 
before engaging in such business. It is true that Section 
7-3-6 has a filing fee set up, but that is a filing fee in 
connection with the application, but not a question of 
an occupation fee nor a prerequisite to doing business 
nor is there any provision in that section or elsewhere 
in the act with respect to prohibiting a bank from con-
tinuing branch banking business if it does not pay 
the fees required by Section 7-1-11 provided it does 
have the capital required by Section 7-3-6 or other 
similar laws. 
It will be interesting to examine the laws with 
respect to the bank commissioner taking possession of. 
any bank and liquidating the same or seeing that its 
eapital, if impaired, is restored or other provisions 
wherein the hank con1missioner is authorized to take 
over a bank or to stop a bank from doing the business 
it had theretofore done. In no such provision is there 
an~· mention of a failure to pay the fees being a condition 
upon which the hank comn1issioner could take over. 
The hank commissioner could take over if the capital 
is impaired; he n1ay take over if the bank refuses to 
allow the books to be exainined; or he may take over if 
the hank is not paying itR depositors a:r:d creditor~ 
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properly; but if a bank were properly being operated 
and allowing the commissioner to make the examinations 
and no questions of any kind were raised in any respect 
other than a lack of paying the fees required by Section 
7-1-11 there is no provision whereby the bank commis-
sioner or anyone else could stop that bank from continu-
ing its business. The bank commissioner, we think, under 
the law would be entitled to collect the fees for such 
supervision and examination by an action at law, but 
such do not amount to and were never intended to be 
an occupation or a privilege tax that would entitle him 
to prohibit the bank from continuing in business. 
The appellant quotes at page 15 of his Brief from an 
Oklahoma and an Illinois case. From the latter, namely 
Reif vs. Barrett, 188 N. E. 899, he quotes the following: 
"The mission of a license tax, occupation tax or privilege 
tax * * * is always to regulate a given business or to con-
trol the right to engage in a given occupation. It is impos-
ed as a condition or as an element of the conditions uzJOJI 
the right to exercise a given privilege." The quote goes 
on to state that while the tax itself may not always be 
the sole condition yet its payment is invariably made a 
part or a factor in the conditions upon which a business 
may be conducted. Such is not true with respect to the 
laws under attack in this case. There is no condition 
in any of the banking laws that are in any way referahlr 
to the payment of the fee under Section 7-1-11. Again 
o~ page 17 of Appellants Brief, still quoting from the 
Reif case, it is stated that, ''A license in form may not 
be issued to a tax-payer, but the pa~·nwnt of the tax is 
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the license under the authority to engage in such occupa-
tion." That is not the case under the law involved here. 
Again that case goes on,-" The payment of the tax itself 
is a condition precedent to the privilege of carrying on 
a business or occupation. The payment of the tax is 
made mandatory, by the act creating it, upon. the right 
of the individual to follow the given occupation." That 
is not so under the facts of this case. 
Again in 33 Am. J urs., page 326, Sec. 3, Licenses, 
as quoted on page 17 of Appellants Brief, in referring to 
a license or a privilege tax the text states that even 
though such tax may also be passed to raise revenue, 
it is imposed upon the right to exercise a privilege and 
its payinent is made a condition to the exercise or 
continuance in the exercise of the privilege, business 
or vocation involved. That also shows that the monies 
required to be paid under Section 7-1-11 are not pri-
vilege or occupation taxes. 
Furthermore, with regard to the contention that 
the charges assessed constitute a valid occupation or 
franchise tax, it should be pointed out that such is not 
the case for the further reason, in addition to those set 
forth above in this Brief, that the tax or franchise 
tax, as they would call it, is not placed upon and does 
not fall upon all persons engaged in a like occupation in 
the State of Utah. As has been shown, national banks, 
who are depositories of public funds, are under the 
jurisdiction of the banking department through the State 
Depository Board and the banking department has made 
and makes examinations of such national banks to deter-
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mine whether or not they are proper public fund deposi-
tories, and yet such national banks, do not pay and are 
not required to pay anything into the financial institu-
tions fund and are not assessed under the provisions 
of the statutes complained of. 
Another basis upon which this law should be held 
unconstitutional is the fact that even though there may 
have been a proper classification at the time the Act 
was passed in 1933 and 1935, events which have trans-
pired since have caused the classification to become 
entirely out of balance. At that time the highest classi-
fication contained in the law was a bank having asse~s 
of $15,000,000.00 or over. It may be that at that time 
there were not very many banks with assets very much 
in excess of $15,000,000.00, but today there are banks 
having assets totaling in excess of $80,000,000.00 and 
for such banks having assets in excess of $80,000,000.00 
and other banks with assets far in excess of what are 
referred to in the classifications in the statute, the 
classifications by virtue of inflationary tendencies and 
by virtue of what has transpired since the passage of the 
Act in 1933 and 1935, have resulted in placing the plain-
tiff in a category where it is discriminated against and 
is not dealt with equally and fairly and is not given 
equal protection of the laws. This result appears in 
bold relief under the evidence in this case which shows 
that for the year in question the plaintiff was assessed 
hy and paid to the defendant bank commissioner under 
the statutes in question the sum of $3450.00 on aggregate 
assets of $11,800,000 while another state bank with aggre-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
gate assets of over $80,000,000 paid only a total of $1500 
under the same statutes. 
"\Y e believe it is clear from the facts as set forth 
hereinabove and as shown by the record that the charge 
made by the statutes under consideration here are not 
valid either as a property tax or as an excise or fran-
chise or occupation tax. They are not, in fact, valid 
occupation or franchise taxes because they do not have 
the necessary incidents of such taxes, namely, the pay-
ment of such charges are not made a prerequisite to 
the doing of business. Even if it were otherwise apparent 
that such charges were intended to be in the nature of 
a franchise or occupation tax neverthless they would 
not be valid as such occupational regulatory tax because 
of the fact that undisputedly there is no reasonable 
relationship between the regulatory services rendered 
by the State of Utah and the amount charged to the bank-
ing institutions. In the case of Provo City v. Provo Meat 
and Packing Co., -19 Ut. 528, 165 Pac. 477, this court 
stated: 
"The courts, we think, all hold that where 
the purpose of the ordinance or statute is to 
regulate, under the police power, the amount of 
the license fee or tax must be reasonable, and may 
not exceed the reasonable cost of preparing and 
issuing the license and reasonable expenses of 
inspection and supervision." 
'11he charges exacted by the statutes in question are 
not valid as fees, because in the language of this court in 
Smith v. Carbon Co., the amount required to be paid 
"doe~ not hear a reasonable relation to the expense and 
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kind of services required to be performed," and hence 
the money required to be paid may not be said to be 
a valid fee. 
In view of these conclusions it becomes obvious 
that the charges required to be paid under the provisions 
of Section 7-1-11 and 7-3-6 are in fact ad valorem or 
property taxes based entirely upon the value of the 
aggregate assets of the banking institutions charged 
with payment of said monies. Being such property 
taxes, they are invalid by reason of the fact that they 
violate the uniformity provisions of the constitution. 
Furthermore, since they are in fact ad valorem or pro-
perty taxes they violate the provisions of A1:ticle 13, 
Section 11 of the Constitution of Utah which section 
requires that the State Tax Commission shall administer 
and supervise the tax laws of the State, whereas under 
the provisions of the banking laws these charges are 
collected, administered and in every way supervised 
by the banking department. 
A further contention of the plaintiff and appellant 
in the lower court was that Section 7 -3-o was invalid 
by reason of the fact that the Act upon which said 
Section is based violated the provisions of Section 2:5 
Article 6 of the Constitution of the State of Utah whieh 
provides that : 
"except general appropriations bills, and bills 
for the codification and general revision of the 
laws, no bill shall be passed containing more than 
one subject, which shall be clearly expressed 
in its title." 
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The court below found that this provision of law was 
not violated and the appellants have indicated that for 
this reason they do not discuss the issue here. It is our 
understanding, however, that constitutional questions 
may be raised at any time and respondents have not 
abandoned this contention. The Section in question was 
enacted as Chapter 12, Laws of Utah 1937. The Act in 
question was titled: 
"An Act Amending Section 7-3-6, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, as Amended by Chapter 6, 
Laws of Utah, 1933, and as Amended by a Bill 
Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah, 
1937, Known as Senate Bill No. 30, and Approved 
on the 16th Day of February, 1937, Providing 
for Establishment of Branching of Offices of 
Banks Upon the Approval of the State Bank 
Commissioner and Fixing the Penalty for Viola-
tion of the Provisions Hereof, and Repealing the 
Bill So Enacted by the Legislature of the State 
Of Utah, 1937, and Approved the 16th day of 
February, 1937, Known as Senate Bill No. 30." 
It will be observed that nowhere in the title of the 
Art is any mention made that such Act imposes a pro-
perty tax ·upon branch banks or upon any banking 
institutions or otherwise nor is any franchise or license 
tax nor even examination fee mentioned. No one hy 
reading the title could know that any tax of any kind 
was imposed by said Act. In State ex rel Nettleton 1:. 
Case (vVash) 81 Pac. 554, it wa~ held that frmn a title 
reading: 
"An Act in relation to the fee~ of State and 
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County Officers, witnesses, and jurors," 
it could "by no reasonable exercise of the imagination" 
be inferred that the Act treated "of the subject of an ad 
valorem charge or tax upon the property. of estates", and 
that consequently the Act violated the constitutional 
provisions as to the expression of the subject of a 
statute in the title thereof. 
In passing it might be observed that the bank com-
missioner recognized the lack of uniformity and the 
inequities in the schedule of charges as set up by Sees. 
7-1-11 and 7-3-6 and at his suggestion the 1951 Legisla-
ture amended these statutes completely revising and 
changing said schedule of charges. (Chapters 10 & 12-
Laws of Utah, 1951) 
CONCLUSION 
The charges set up and assessed under the pro-
visions of Section 7-1-11 and 7-3-6 have no reasonable 
relation to the services performed or to be performed 
by the banking department in connection with the super-
vision, regulation and examination of the institutions 
from whom such charges are sought to be collected. The 
charges referred to bear none of the incidents of an 
occupation, franchise, or excise tax in order to make 
them a valid regula tory tax. The charges assessed are 
clearly ad valorem or property taxes based upon the 
value of the property represented by the aggregate 
assets of the banking institutions and hence are invalid 
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as violative of the provision~ of Article XIII, Sections 
2, 3 and 11 and Article I, Section 24 and Article VI, 
Section 23 of the Constitution of Utah. 
We submit that the decision of the lower court was 
proper and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
A. lT. ~liNER 
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